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Trade liberalization, factor market flexibility, and growth: 




In recent years there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of 
complementary policies in enhancing the benefits of a more open trade regime. This 
study focuses on the importance of factor market flexibility to trade reforms. Using the 
GTAP model and database, the results show that the welfare impact of trade reform is 
contingent on the flexibility of factor markets, with higher welfare gains occurring where 
factor markets are more flexible, and vice-versa. Defining two extreme factor market 
scenarios over Morocco and Tunisia, we find that the welfare gains of trade reforms 
under conditions of flexible factor markets can be as much as six times the gains 
compared to a rigid factor market scenario. This is so because whereas trade reforms 
may improve the incentive structure for resource re-allocation, the extent to which 
resources  move from less efficient to more efficient sectors of an economy is dependent 
on the degree of  flexibility of factor markets.  
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There is a large body of literature on the impact of trade reforms on growth. The static 
gains of an open trade orientation are argued to improve welfare via a more efficient 
allocation of resources in accordance with the comparative advantage of an economy. 
The dynamic benefits are purported to increase the long-run steady-state growth rate via 
improvements in technology and total factor productivity resulting from being ‘open’ 
(Grossman and Helpman (1991), Coe and Helpman (1995), and Edwards (1998)).  While 
the empirical literature is generally conclusive on the deleterious impact of inward 
oriented policies on growth, the theoretical case for the unambiguous positive impact of 
trade liberalization on economic growth has been far from demonstrated.   
Earlier studies (Michaely 1991, Dollar 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995, Edwards 1998) 
showing the beneficial impact of open trade policies have in recent years come under 
sharp criticism. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) assert that “……. the nature of the 
relationship between trade policy and economic growth remains very much an open 
question. The issue is far from being settled on empirical grounds. We are in fact 
skeptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship between trade openness and 
growth awaiting to be discovered”. Similarly (Milner et. al., 1999) succinctly ask whether 
“we are looking for something that is not actually there”. These statements appear to 
temper earlier views that portrayed trade liberalization as a panacea to the economic 
problems of inward oriented countries including sluggish growth. Rodrik and Rodriguez 
(2001) posit that they suspect the relationship to be a contingent one depending on a host 
of country and external characteristics. Krueger (1998) also shares this view as it is 
recognized that trade policy does not operate in a vacuum and that other policies 
supporting trade liberalization may be necessary and in any event can greatly increase the 
benefits. Failure to address these issues could result in smaller gains from trade 
liberalization and in extreme cases no benefit would be gained. Not surprisingly, Rodrik 
and Rodriguez recommend that “research aimed at ascertaining the circumstances under 
which open trade policies are conducive to growth (as well as those under which they 
may not be) and at scrutinizing the channels through which trade policies influence 
economic performance is likely to prove more productive”.   3
In recent years there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of 
complementary policies in enhancing the benefits of a more open trade regime. 
Complementary policies argued to be important have included: sound macroeconomic 
policies, market supporting institutions, efficient customs procedures, good 
infrastructural base, business regulations, functioning credit markets, and flexible labor 
markets (Winters 2002, Hoekmann et al 2001). This study will focus on the importance 
of factor market flexibility in the effectiveness of trade reforms. Given that some of the 
gains from an open trade regime come from improvements in resource allocation, 
rigidities in factor markets are expected to limit the benefits of an open trade regime. 
Indeed, Bolaky and Freund (2004), using cross-country regressions, find that once the 
effect of domestic regulation is controlled for, the evidence that trade positively affects 
growth is stronger than has been found in previous studies. They argue that excessive 
regulations restrict growth because resources are prevented from moving into the most 
productive sectors and to the most efficient firms within sectors. Furthermore, using a 
computable general equilibrium model of the Philippines, Salehezadeh and Henneberry 
(2002) find that for a given trade policy, a higher degree of factor mobility results in a 
higher economic growth rate and an improvement in overall economic welfare. This 
study will consider the extent to which factor market flexibilities might impact on trade 
reforms, using Tunisia and Morocco as case studies.  
Tariff Reforms in Morocco and Tunisia  
In contrast to the trend of tariff liberalization in many developing countries, Tunisia and 
Morocco have demonstrated mixed progress in tariff liberalization. For instance, except 
in 2002 where tariffs increased to 33.9%, simple average most favored nation (MFN) 
tariffs have held steady between 28% and 30% over the 1990-2004 period (figure 1) in 
Tunisia. In the case of Morocco, after significant liberalization of the average MFN rates 
from 65% in 1993 to 21.7% in 1997, tariff rates have since increased, remaining around 
30% in recent years (figure 2). Tariff reforms implemented in Morocco and Tunisia are 
weak in comparison to Jordan (whose average MFN tariffs fell from 22.1% in 2000 to 
13.2% in 2003) and Lebanon (where average tariffs dropped from 14.7% in 2000 to 5.4% 
in 2002). Morocco and Tunisia are observed to have the most restrictive MFN tariff 
regime in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) (figure 3). Given that MENA is one of   4
the most trade restrictive regions in the world (World Bank 2003), this places domestic 
producers (including exporters) in Morocco and Tunisia at a competitive disadvantage in 
terms of accessing cheap inputs, as well as raising the prices of imported final goods to 
consumers with its concomitant effect on their welfare. However, the existence of export 
processing zones as well as a network of preferential trade agreements (including with 
the EU) have reduced the actual tariffs faced by some producers. Indeed, preferential 
access to the EU market has accounted for the large share of trade that both Morocco and 
Tunisia have with the EU (over 60%). Nonetheless, it would appear that there is 
considerable room for further liberalization of the MFN tariff regime of both Morocco 
and Tunisia, especially so as both countries are soon to fulfil their liberalization 
obligations under the free trade agreement with the EU. 
 















1990  1992  1995  1998 2002 2003 2004 
Fig 1: Tunisia: simple average MFN tariffs
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Hence a reduction in MFN rates would serve to reduce the extent of trade diversion that 
could take place from preferential liberalization, as well as allowing for more competition 
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Fig 2: Morocco:  simple average MFN tariffs  6
 
Rigidities in Factor Markets 
Recent studies in both Morocco and Tunisia point to the existence of significant rigidities 
in factor markets. The recent World Bank Development Policy Review on Tunisia 
recommends that for Tunisia to maximize the employment gains of its international 
integration, labor market regulations and institutions need to be flexible so that employers 
and workers can adjust to changes in business conditions. While acknowledging recent 
efforts to introduce flexibility in hiring, rigidities in the labor market persist due to: 
restrictions on the use of temporary help agency workers and expatriate employees; 
heavy bureaucratic processes to be followed before dismissals; and generous severance 
payments. Similar rigidities also exist in the Morocco labor market. The recent Morocco 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) reports that a third of the enterprises surveyed 
expressed difficulties in laying-off workers that were no longer needed due to the high 
costs involved. Some 25% of enterprises surveyed indicated that if restrictions on worker 
lay-offs were lifted they would downsize their labor force, whereas some 11% indicated 
that they would increase their employment. Furthermore, evidence from the World 
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Bank’s Doing Business Report in 2006 (WBDBR) shows Morocco and Tunisia to have 
rigid labor markets compared to other developing countries (fig 4).
2  
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Rigidities in other factor markets in Tunisia include: delays in securing finance, land and 
construction permits; difficulties in closing businesses due to lengthy bankruptcy 
procedures; restrictions on majority capital ownership by foreign investors in key sectors; 
and general restrictions to entry (foreign and national) in certain activities (World Bank 
2004). The recent Morocco ICA also points to difficulties faced by firms in raising 
finances from banks as well as in accessing land. The high cost of finance and access to 
industrial land was considered to be a major constraint by some 80% and 43% of firms 
surveyed, respectively. The 2006 WBDBR shows that the minimum capital requirement 
(as a percent of income per capita) in Morocco was 700.3% compared to an average of 
177.3% for all countries included in the survey. The figure for Tunisia declined from 
327.8% in the 2004 WBDBR to 29.8% in the 2006 WBDBR, showing improvement in 
this area. 
Model 
It is against this background of existing factor market rigidities that we consider how 
improved flexibilities in the factor markets could affect the impact of trade reforms. A 
                                                 
2 Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/CustomQuery [1 September 2005].   8
computable general equilibrium model is adopted for this study. CGE models are 
economy-wide models with details on different markets in an economy and are well 
suited to capture the economy-wide ramifications of trade reforms. Furthermore, the 
existence of an explicit factor market thus allows the modeller to change the level of 
factor market flexibility. This study applies the standard GTAP model but with changes 
to certain parameters affecting the flexibility of factor markets. Hertel (1997) provides a 
detailed description of the model. For purposes of this study we present the production 
structure of the GTAP model focusing on the contribution of factors of production.  
Production takes place through a nested structure. At the top nest, value-added and 
intermediate inputs are combined in accordance with a Leontief production function (i.e. 
fixed proportions). Value-added is formed through combinations of labor (skilled and 
unskilled), land, natural resources, and capital using the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functional form. Factors of production are assumed to be fully employed. 
Intermediate goods are formed through the combination of imported and domestically 
produced goods. At the lowest nest, imported bundles are formed through CES 
combinations of imported goods from each region.  
Factors of production thus enter the production structure through the value-added nest. 
The derived conditional demand equations for the value-added nest (expressed in 
percentage changes) in the GTAP model are:   
∑ − =
k
r j k afe r j k pfe r j k SVA r j pva 1 ......... .......... .......... .......... )]........ , , ( ) , , ( [ * ) , , ( ) , ( 
2 )]...... , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( [ * ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( r j pva r j i afe r j i pfe j r j qva r j i afe r j i qfe va − − − = + σ   
where: 
 qfe(i,j,r)  the quantity of endowment commodity i demanded by firms in sector j of region r. 
pfe (k,j,r) demand price of endowment commodity k for firms in sector j of region r  
SVA (i,j,r) share of endowment commodity i in value-added if firms in sector j of region r evaluated at 
agent prices. 
afe (i,j,r)  primary factor i  augmenting technical change in sector j of region r  
qva(j,r) value added in firms of sector j in region r 
pva (j,r)  price of value-added in sector j of region r    
) ( j va σ  substitution parameter between primary factors in the CES value-added nest of the nested 
production structure of sector j of all regions. 
) ( j va σ , the elasticity of substitution parameter, is the component of the conditional 
demand equation influencing the flexibility of the factor markets. A higher  ) ( j va σ    9
implies greater substitution possibilities between factors of production and, ceteris 
paribus, greater demand for factors of production and vice-versa. On the one hand   
factors of production can be defined to be inter-sectorally immobile, hence not responsive 
to relative price changes. On the other hand, factors of production can be allowed to be 
mobile between sectors, thereby responding to changes in relative prices.   
Another part of the model with implications for the flexibility of the capital market 
relates to the mechanism for investment allocation. In the GTAP model, investment funds 
are allocated across regions through a “global bank”, in accordance with the rates of 
return to capital across regions. Investors in the model behave as if they expect that a 
region’s rate of return in the next period (RORE(r)), will decline with positive additions 
to the capital stock. The rate at which this decline is expected is however a function of a 
flexibility parameter (RORFLEX). The behavioral equation describing this relationship 
is: 
3 ......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... )]........ ( ) ( [ * ) ( ) ( ) ( r kb r ke r RORFLEX r rorc r rore − − =
Where: 
rore(r) is the expected net rate of return on capital stock in region r 
rorc(r) is the current net rate of return on capital stock in region r 
kb(r) is the beginning-of-period capital stock in region r 
ke(r) is the end-of-period capital stock in region r 
RORFLEX is the flexibility of expected net rate of return on capital stock in region r with respect to 
investment   
RORFLEX (r) is defined such that if a region’s capital stock increases by 1%, then its 
expected net rate of return on capital will decline by RORFLEX%. Hence a small value 
implies that the rate of return on capital is relatively insensitive to net investments. 
Higher RORFLEX thus imply that the expected rate of return on capital is low; in a 
certain sense this may reflect a weak investment climate.     
Data 
The model used for this study draws data from the GTAP 6 database. Although this 
version of the GTAP database allows for 87 regions and 57 commodities, its coverage of 
MENA is rather limited. The database has separate data for Morocco and Tunisia, while 
the rest of MENA is aggregated into “the rest of North Africa” (RONAF), and “the rest 
of the Middle East” (ROMIDE). This study uses a 13 region by 16 commodity 
aggregation, which captures all the MENA sub-regions, key trading partners and key 
commodities. Details of the aggregation are provided in appendix table A1.    10
Simulations 
Given that there is considerable policy space for the liberalization of the MFN tariff 
regime in both Morocco and Tunisia, as discussed earlier, a 50% unilateral tariff 
reduction simulation is carried out. This simulation is, however, performed under two 
extreme factor market scenarios - restrictive and flexible. A high degree of factor market 
restrictiveness is defined by a low elasticity of substitution between factors of production 
() ( j va σ =0.1), immobile capital, and low responsiveness of investment to the rate of 
return on investment (RORFLEX=0.9). The flexible market scenario is defined by a high 
elasticity of substitution between factors of production ( ) ( j va σ =2), mobile capital, and 
high responsiveness of investment to the rate of return on investment (RORFLEX=0.1). 
Given that parameters defining the actual level of restrictiveness have not been 
econometrically estimated (this is beyond the scope of the current study) the two levels of 
restrictiveness can be seen as some sort of upper and lower bound level. In sum the below 
four simulations are implemented: 
•  50% unilateral tariff liberalization under restrictive factor markets for Morocco 
•  50% unilateral tariff liberalization under flexible factor markets for Morocco 
•  50% unilateral tariff liberalization under restrictive factor markets for Tunisia 
•  50% unilateral tariff liberalization under flexible factor markets for Tunisia 
Results and Discussion  
Under both restrictive and flexible factor market scenarios, the model shows that trade 
reforms led to welfare gains for both Morocco and Tunisia. This lends support to the 
view that a more liberal trade policy is welfare enhancing. However, the results show that 
the gains to liberalizing the trade regime are significantly higher under the flexible 
market scenario. Welfare gains in Morocco increased from $163.4 million under the 
restrictive factor market scenario to $501.4 million under the flexible factor market 
scenario, i.e. by some three times. In the case of Tunisia, welfare increased from $67.2 
million to $404.9 million, i.e. by some six times (fig 5). GDP also increased by about an 
additional 0.6 and 1 percentage points for Morocco and Tunisia respectively when 
moving from a restrictive factor market situation to a flexible one (fig 6).    11












































Figures 7 and 8 (more details are provided in appendix tables A2-A5) present the results 
of resource reallocation due to the changes in the incentive structure that were 
engendered by the tariff liberalization. As expected, the movement of factors of 
production in each industry is, in general, greater under the flexible factor market 
scenario. Hence resources are able to move away from sectors of less comparative 
advantage to sectors of greater comparative advantage. For instance, the rise in labor used   12
in apparel industry was below 5% for both countries under the restrictive factor market 
scenario compared to at least 21% under the flexible factor market scenario. On the other 
hand, there was a less than a 1% reduction in labor (skilled and unskilled) employed in 
the oil and gas sector for both countries under the restrictive factor market scenario 
compared to the 20% reduction in labor under the flexible market scenario. In other 
words, labor is more responsive to the improved incentive structure under flexible factor 
markets than under a restrictive one. It is the greater movement of labor from the less 
productive sectors to the more productive sectors under the flexible market scenario 
compared to the restrictive market scenario that generates the higher welfare gains 
observed under the flexible market scenario. It is important to recognize that there could 
also be a loss of employment in certain sectors as part of the labor adjustment process 
from trade reforms, hence governments need to be prepared to deal with this. Hardship 
relief support say through unemployment benefits could be beneficial in the short-term. 
In the long term providing re-training and information on job opportunities, and 
incentives for start-ups could be helpful.  










































































































Restrictive Flexible  
These results are also true for capital and land. Under the restrictive factor market 
scenario, the capital used remains unchanged due to the sector specific nature of capital,   13
whereas  under the flexible factor market scenario there are varying changes (-7 to 38%) 
in the amount of capital employed (tables A2-A5). Land use by sector also changes in 
line with the greater factor market flexibility. By extension, one could argue that to the 
extent that land and capital are complementary to labor in the production process, 
rigidities in the land and capital market may also restrain output and employment 
generation.  
 





































Conclusion and Policy Implications 
For the purposes of this paper, the two extreme scenarios used help to highlight the 
importance of factor market flexibility in determining the impact of trade reforms. It is 
observed that trade reforms can improve the incentive structure for resource re-allocation 
in an economy; however, the extent to which resources are reallocated is contingent on 
the flexibility of relevant factor markets.  Limited factor market flexibilities will in turn 
limit the re-allocation of resources from less optimal uses to more optimal uses, thereby 
reducing the growth and welfare impact of trade reforms. Given the centrality of factor 
market flexibility in influencing resource re-allocation, by extension one could argue that  
the effectiveness of a variety of economic policies (including trade policy) that seek to   14
improve the incentive structure for resource reallocation (taxation, privatization, 
investment incentives, etc.) are also contingent on the flexibility of factor markets. In the 
light of these observations, efforts to address existing rigidities in factor markets (labor, 
capital and land) in Morocco and Tunisia should be seen as an integral part of enhancing 
the effectiveness of trade reforms as well as other structural reforms. More flexible factor 
markets should be seen as reinforcing the effectiveness of other structural reforms.   15
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Table A1. Regional and Commodity Aggregation 
Regions (13)  Commodities (16) 
Morocco, Tunisia, rest of Middle 
East, rest of North Africa, EU, 
Central and Eastern Europe, US, 
rest of North America, Japan, 
East Asia,  China, rest of World,  
food, manufactures, services, oil & gas, apparel, 
electronic equipment, transport and machinery, 
Fruits and vegetables, Communication, sea & air 
transport, other transport, chemical & plastics, 
petroleum products, textiles, fish and live animals.  
 
Fig A2: Morocco (restrictive factor market): intersectoral resource re-allocation 
  Land UnSkLab SkLab Capital NatRes 
Food -0.36  -1.05  -1.35  0  0 
Mnfcs -0.84  -1.57  -1.87 0  -0.01 
Svces 0.95  0.39  0.09  0  0.01 
Oilgas 0.05  -0.59  -0.89  0  0 
Apparel 4.74 4.56  4.26  0  0.05 
ele 2.76  2.38  2.08  0  0.03 
TranMach 1.32  0.81  0.51  0 0.02 
FrutVeg 0.62 0.03  -0.27  0  0.01 
Comm 0.59  0  -0.3  0  0.01 
SeaAirTrans 0.79  0.22 -0.08  0  0.01 
OtherTrans 0.69  0.11  -0.19  0  0.01 
Chemplastic 0.7  0.12  -0.19  0  0.01 
Petrol 0.53  -0.07  -0.37  0  0.01 
Textiles 3.94 3.69 3.38  0  0.05 
Fish 0.79  0.22  -0.08  0  0.01 
LiveAniml 0.73  0.16  -0.15  0 0.01 
Fig A3: Morocco (flexible factor market): intersectoral resource re-allocation 
  Land UnSkLab SkLab Capital NatRes 
Food -0.18  -2.82  -4.98  -3.15  0 
Mnfcs -2.46  -9.42  -11.57  -9.75 0 
Svces 1.96  3.38  1.23  3.06  0.01 
Oilgas -6.8  -22.02  -24.18  -22.35  -0.01 
Apparel 8.78  23.18  21.02  22.85  0.02 
ele 2.22  4.15  1.99  3.82  0.01 
TranMach -0.12  -2.63  -4.79 -2.96  0 
FrutVeg -0.04  -2.4  -4.55  -2.72  0 
Comm -0.14 -2.7  -4.86  -3.03 0 
SeaAirTrans 0.08  -2.05 -4.21  -2.38  0 
OtherTrans 0.36  -1.26  -3.41 -1.58  0 
Chemplastic -1.37  -6.26  -8.42  -6.59  0 
Petrol 0.86  0.21  -1.94  -0.12  0   18
Textiles 5.34  13.21 11.05  12.88  0.01 
Fish 0.81  0.07  -2.09  -0.26  0 
LiveAniml 1.17  1.09  -1.07 0.76  0 
Fig A4: Tunisia (restrictive factor market): intersectoral resource re-allocation 
  Land UnSkLab SkLab Capital NatRes 
Food -1.08  -2.53  -2.69  0  -0.02 
Mnfcs 0.81  -0.45  -0.61  0  0 
Svces 1.31  0.1  -0.06  0  0 
Oilgas 1.2  -0.02  -0.19  0  0 
Apparel 5.76  5  4.84  0  0.05 
ele 1.3  0.09  -0.07  0  0 
TranMach 8.05  7.52  7.36  0 0.08 
FrutVeg 0.42  -0.88  -1.04  0  -0.01 
Comm 1.21  -0.01  -0.17  0  0 
SeaAirTrans 1.19  -0.03 -0.19  0  0 
OtherTrans 1.14  -0.09  -0.25  0  0 
Chemplastic 1.98  0.83  0.67  0  0.01 
Petrol 1.07  -0.16  -0.32  0  0 
Textiles 2.31  1.2 1.04  0  0.01 
Fish 1.02  -0.22  -0.38  0  0 
LiveAniml -0.5  -1.89  -2.05  0  -0.02 
 
Fig A5: Tunisia (flexible factor market): intersectoral resource re-allocation 
  Land UnSkLab SkLab Capital NatRes 
Food -1.83  -13.71  -16.91  -13.44  0 
Mnfcs -0.05  -8.53  -11.73  -8.27  0 
Svces 4.33  4.15  0.95  4.42  0.01 
Oilgas -4.57  -21.66  -24.86  -21.4 0 
Apparel 13.81  31.64  28.44  31.91  0.02 
ele 0.8  -6.06  -9.27  -5.8  0 
TranMach 4.14  3.61  0.41  3.87 0.01 
FrutVeg 0.9  -5.78  -8.98  -5.52  0 
Comm 3.32  1.25  -1.96  1.51  0.01 
SeaAirTrans -0.46  -9.72 -12.92  -9.45  0 
OtherTrans 0.73  -6.27  -9.47 -6.01  0 
Chemplastic 1.87  -2.98 -6.18  -2.72  0.01 
Petrol 1.23  -4.83  -8.03  -4.56  0 
Textiles 5.24  6.79 3.59  7.06  0.01 
Fish 2.23  -1.92  -5.12  -1.65  0.01 
LiveAniml -2.36  -15.23  -18.43  -14.96  0 
 